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哈佛法学教授拨冗指正 LAO律师 HOLDING 概念错误
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一个案子， Worcester v. Gerogia ，我指出其 holding 是【印第安人有一定的自主权、不容州政府侵犯。。。这个案子的更为广泛的holding是其关于印第安部落自主权不容州侵犯及其与联邦的关系的法律结论。以后乔治亚或者其他州制订新的企图管辖印第安部落的法律，按照这个 holding, 这些新法律也是无效的、违宪的。】我还举了好几个后续案例说明这一点（后续案例引用用 held 一词）。而且根据HOLDING的定义做了分析。
对此，LAO 律师写了一篇长文，说《揭示岳东晓博士对1832年传道士案论述的谬误（2）》。LAO说这个案子的 holding是【传教士案件判决法 (holding): Georgia 要求白人申请在切诺基部落居住执照法律违宪无效。 (“The act of the state of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in error was prosecuted, is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity.” 】
LAO还称：【其他和判决和判决法不相关的都是论证语 (dictum), 没有任何判决执行法律性, 不构成任何先例法律性，高级法院后来的案例中称这是法官Marshall 的陈述，或者观点， 包括最著名的“切诺基部落国是个独特的群体，有自己的领地和邦界， 州政府对部落国的法律无法律效力。】
读懂案例，明白哪些是 HOLDING 对于律师来说是最基本的能力。因为 HOLDING 才是有法律效力的。诉讼中如果分不清HOLDING，等于盲人夜行。
但我再怎么说，读者还是疑惑。为此，我昨天给哈佛大学法学院一位教授（他写过关于印第安人的这些案例的评论）发了个EMAIL，特意请教 WORCESTER案的HOLDING是什么。他今天回答到：
翻译如下：其基本的HOLDING是乔治亚的法律不能延伸到切诺基部落国，因为关系是部落-联邦，而不是部落-州。
教授的姓名我就不写了（尚未征求其许可），如果有兴趣的，可以去问问其他法学教授。
下面是若干法院谈到WORCESTER案的HOLDING时的说法：
- Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 US 775 （1991）
Illustrative of this principle are our cases holding that the law of the State is generally inapplicable to Native American affairs, absent the consent of Congress. See, e. g., Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832). Chief Justice Marshall explained for the Court in Worcester that a federally recognized tribe
"is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of [the State] can have no force, and which the citizens of [the State] have no right to enter, but with the assent of the [tribes] themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States." Id., at 561.
United States v. Kagama, 118 US 375 （1886）
In the case of Worcester v. The State of Georgia, above cited, it was held that, though the Indians had by treaty sold their land within that State, and agreed to remove away, which they had failed to do, the State could not, while they remained on those lands, extend its laws, criminal and civil, over the tribes; that the duty and power to compel their removal was in the United States, and the tribe was under their protection, and could not be subjected to the laws of the State and the process of its courts.
In re Colwash, 356 P. 2d 994 - Wash: Supreme Court 1960
I shall not repeat here what I there said concerning the constitutional basis of that power, or the holding in Worcester v. Georgia (1832), 31 U.S. 515, 8 L.Ed. 483, where Chief Justice Marshall stated the source of that power in two sentences (p. 559):
"That instrument [the constitution] confers on congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians...."
Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. v. State of Wis., 518 F. Supp. 712
In a case holding that the State of Georgia could not enforce its laws on the Cherokee Reservation, which was within the external boundaries of the state, the Supreme Court held:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force... The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.
Worcester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832).
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 US 353
Our holding in Worcester must be considered in light of the fact that "[t]he 1828 treaty with the Cherokee Nation . . . guaranteed the Indians their lands would never be subjected to the jurisdiction of any State or Territory." Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 71 (1962); cf. Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 221-222 (comparing Navajo treaty to the Cherokee treaty in Worcester ).
- http://sct.narf.org/articles/supreme_court_indian_problem_fletcher_2007.pdf
The final piece of the Trilogy is Worcester, where Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion garnered a 5-1 majority holding that the laws of the State
of Georgia do not extend into Indian Country where they conflict with federal
laws or Indian treaties.
发表评论 评论 (2 个评论)
- 回复 方枪枪
- 律师依据的是高院的案例。他的意思应该是“乔治亚的法律不能延伸到切诺基部落国”这个不能构成任何先例法律性，没有任何判决执行法律性。
哈佛教授对还是律师对我也不清楚。
两人中总有一个是谬误。 
也许该问问那位家里有人读法学院的朋友，那个应该比这两人还厉害一些。在正确性方面，可能法学院未毕业比网上称有律师证的厉害，网上称有律师证的比哈佛法学教授厉害。
我只能叹口气了，够不着啊，要是我有个律师邻居，我可能比他们三都厉害。
- 回复 岳东晓
- 分析是否 holding ，应该单从判决文就能看出。LAO所说的 holding 实际应该说是判决的 conclusion。Holding 是做出这个结论的必要法律原则基础。
方枪枪: 律师依据的是高院的案例。他的意思应该是“乔治亚的法律不能延伸到切诺基部落国”这个不能构成任何先例法律性，没有任何判决执行法律性。
哈佛教授对还是律师对 ...
Worcester 案核心是这一点：【 Indian reservation “is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which ... [state laws] can have no force ....” 】 LAO认为这段不是 holding 的”逻辑“是：（1）By 1880 the Court no longer viewed reservations ad distinct nations； （2）如果那段是 holding，最高法院必须明确推翻它。
这个”逻辑”是断链的。法院在判决一个案子时，完全可能发生忽略了一个先例的情况。
参见 http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_magazine_index/marshall.html
In more recent cases, the Court has upheld the principle of tribal sovereignty first articulated in Worcester. For example, in Williams v. Lee (358 U.S. 217 (1959)), the Court ruled that Arizona state courts did not have jurisdiction in a civil case that involved a non-Indian who sued two reservation Indians for an alleged breach of contract that happened on the reservation. The Court concluded that allowing state jurisdiction in such a case would undermine the authority of tribal courts to decide matters that arise on the reservation--a clear infringement of the right of Indian self-government.
