日志
Susie Ling - REPEAL OF THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT: A CONTRADICTION
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By Susie Ling INTRODUCTION
https://gumsaanjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/scanned_volumes/gsj-1993.pdf
Fifty years ago in the midst of World War II, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed on 17 December 1943. President Franklin Roosevelt said of the bill that he endorsed:
“It is with particular pride and pleasure that I have today signed the bill repealing the Chinese exclusion laws. The Chinese people, I am sure, will take pleasure in knowing that this represents a manifestation on the part of the American people of their affection and regard” (quoted in Divine 152).
The Chinese Exclusion Act, the first U.S. immigration act to discriminate against a particular ethnic group, was always viewed as the epitome of anti-Chinese American sentiment. It was the symbol of the racism that kept Chinese American* pioneers, their children, and their grandchildren from being recognized as full American citizens.
During World War II, China was an ally of the United States against the Axis powers. Chinese, and thus, Chinese Americans, became viewed as “faithful allies, heroic fighters, and tragic victims” (Lyman 125). Chinese Americans in the 1940s were in a quagmire. The war significantly changed the status of Chinese Americans. Previously, they had generally been isolated in Chinatowns, restricted socially and legally from participating in the American mainstream, and viewed as exotic “foreigners.” But in 1943, Chinese Americans gained rights to own land and were even drafted into the American military. Whatever their personal feelings, Chinese Americans stood aside while the Japanese Americans were interned in concentration camps. The Chinese Americans fervently bought war bonds and saved tin foil for this war “for democracy.” They hoped that this war against the racism of Hitler would also be the war against domestic racism, if not for all Asians including the Japanese, at least for the Chinese Americans. They hoped that the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act would be one more step for Chinese Americans towards gaining full American citizenship rights.
But the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act was viewed by the U.S. government as a vital component of the war effort to cement political and commercial relations with China. It was not viewed as a part of American domestic civil rights policy. Representative Gossett of Texas argued, “The bill under consideration is not an immigration bill. This bill is a war measure and a peace measure” (quoted in Divine 151). Similarly, President Franklin Roosevelt declared “I regard this legislation as important in the cause of winning the war and of establishing a secure peace. By the repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws we can correct a historic mistake and silence the distorted Japanese propaganda” (quoted in Divine 150). Ironically, Chinese Americans were still viewed as “foreigners” and “sojourners.”
To add to the irony, the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed in name only. In the complex confusion of immigration law, the repeal-only “opened” immigration to a quota of 105 newcomers/year. Thus the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act continued to keep the Chinese excluded -- from immigration and from domestic acceptance.
REVIEW OF THE 1882 CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT
Chinese immigration in this modern historical period began with gold rushers of 1848 and 1849. The myth of Gold Mountain coupled with the real need for cheap laborers in developing the American West caused the migration of tens of thousands of Chinese pioneers to California and the West. These early Chinese pioneers were vulnerable to the American tradition of racism.
Between the Panic of 1873 and the 1893 depression in California, anti-Chinese sentiment was growing into a movement. The boom of the gold rush was now a bust. European immigrants and their sons organized in labor unions such as the American Federation of Labor and the California Workingmen's Party were blaming the “foreigners” for unemployment and other social ills. The “Charles Crackers” who had recruited and contracted these Chinese pioneers were no longer willing to support them. The transcontinental railroad was finished but the Chinese continued to demand more wages and better treatment. On the other hand, Japanese contract laborers could now be recruited to work for even cheaper wages than the older Chinese.
In this atmosphere of economic tension, Samuel Gompers' strengthening American Federation of Labor successfully pushed U.S. Congress to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act. The main reason cited for the immigration restriction was to protect American labor (Curran 90). China was in no position to protest this discriminatory act as it was plagued with internal corruption and foreign colonialism. The imperial Qing (Ching) dynasty, titular government in China, generally viewed persons of Chinese ancestry outside China's boundaries as temporarily displaced subjects or “overseas Chinese” rather than as, say, Chinese Americans. After its defeat in the Opium Wars, the Qing dynasty could neither prevent the 1868 Burlingame Treaty allowing for Chinese immigration to the U.S. nor prevent the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, curtailing immigration to the U.S. Nor could they raise serious objections to the string of discriminatory actions against “overseas Chinese” including 1850s Foreign Miners' Tax, 1860 Police Tax on Mongolians, 1870 Pole Ordinance, 1873 Queue Ordinance, and 1879 California Constitution.
Despite a veto of an earlier version of the bill, President Arthur signed the first Chinese Exclusion Act on 6 May 1882. This law excluded Chinese laborers for ten years and prohibited the naturalization of Chinese already in the U.S. With the 1892 Geary Act and 1902 Act, this law was extended for ten-year periods until 1904, when the exclusion law was extended to run perpetually. The Chinese Exclusion Act prohibited the immigration of Chinese laborers except those classified as merchants, teachers, ministers, students, and visitors.
The ensuing Japanese laborers also wanted better wages and better treatment with time. The 1907 Gentlemen's Agreement curtailing immigration from Japan followed. Koreans, Indians and Pilipino immigration followed a similar pattern of open doors, immigrants agitating for equality, and then, closed doors. In 1924, the Asian Exclusion Act prevented further contract laborers from Asia although Pilipinos who were considered American nationals were exempted for another ten years.
THE REPEAL ACT
The Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed in 1943 during World War II. But the effort to win good will from United States' war ally, China, had little actual impact on immigration trends due to a myriad of technicalities.
In 1924, the National Origins Act was also passed under nativism pressure to curtail certain European immigration. Attempting to limit Slavics, Jews, Catholics, Poles, etc. who had begun to immigrate to Northeastern U.S. by the 1890s, the law of 1924 reduced immigration from European countries by using a formula. A quota of 2 percent of the numbers of residents from each nation as shown by the 1890 census was established. Thus, English immigration could continue but Eastern and Southern European immigration slowed down.
In 1924, the National Origins Act did not actually apply to Chinese as they were already excluded. But the quantitative formula would also have limited immigration from Asian nations to the maximum quota of 105 because the number of Asian residents in the U.S. in 1890 was minimal. Hawaii was not considered part of the United States. Thus, there was a double policy towards Chinese immigration by 1924.
The repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act meant that the Chinese now fell under the jurisdiction of the 1924 National Origins Act. To add injury to insult, U.S. immigration law had always determined quotas based on birth place. But for Chinese (and later Indians), the quota was determined by ancestry. This technicality had appeased anti-repeal efforts in 1943. Thus, a person with 50 percent Chinese blood was considered under the Chinese quota regardless of the person's birth origin. This prevented Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong, a British colony, as well as Chinese immigrants from Europe. Significantly, it established a separate quota of 100 for non-Chinese persons emigrating from China e.g. children of American missionaries and merchants (Sung 79).
Betty Lee Sung in Mountain of Gold (1967) wrote, “In answer to those who envisioned a deluge of Chinese immigrants after repeal, the annual quota of 105 was an effective cork (80-81).” A four-tier preference system was established under the quota. The first 50 percent of a country's quota was reserved for skilled aliens and their families with high education, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability as determined by the Attorney General. The next 30 percent of the quota was set aside for parents of citizens over 21 years of age. The remaining 20 percent was for spouses and children of permanent resident aliens residing in the United States. If there were any remaining slots from the first three preferences, they would go to the fourth preference for siblings or children over 21 years of age of American citizens (82).
The 1943 repeal act gave the right of naturalization to Chinese who had lawfully entered the United States. This was important in principle and some Chinese became eligible for the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. But the large numbers of Chinese who had emigrated as contract laborers before 1882 were now near their 80s and the illegal paper sons who immigrated after 1882 were ineligible. The repeal, however, did allow for future Chinese immigrants to gain citizenship rights.
MOVEMENT TOWARDS REPEAL 公民委员会
According to Fred W. Riggs' Pressures on Congress (1950), the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion Act was the main agent responsible for the 1943 action.
Fifty years ago in the midst of World War II, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed on 17 December 1943. President Franklin Roosevelt said of the bill that he endorsed:
“It is with particular pride and pleasure that I have today signed the bill repealing the Chinese exclusion laws. The Chinese people, I am sure, will take pleasure in knowing that this represents a manifestation on the part of the American people of their affection and regard” (quoted in Divine 152).
The Chinese Exclusion Act, the first U.S. immigration act to discriminate against a particular ethnic group, was always viewed as the epitome of anti-Chinese American sentiment. It was the symbol of the racism that kept Chinese American* pioneers, their children, and their grandchildren from being recognized as full American citizens.
During World War II, China was an ally of the United States against the Axis powers. Chinese, and thus, Chinese Americans, became viewed as “faithful allies, heroic fighters, and tragic victims” (Lyman 125). Chinese Americans in the 1940s were in a quagmire. The war significantly changed the status of Chinese Americans. Previously, they had generally been isolated in Chinatowns, restricted socially and legally from participating in the American mainstream, and viewed as exotic “foreigners.” But in 1943, Chinese Americans gained rights to own land and were even drafted into the American military. Whatever their personal feelings, Chinese Americans stood aside while the Japanese Americans were interned in concentration camps. The Chinese Americans fervently bought war bonds and saved tin foil for this war “for democracy.” They hoped that this war against the racism of Hitler would also be the war against domestic racism, if not for all Asians including the Japanese, at least for the Chinese Americans. They hoped that the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act would be one more step for Chinese Americans towards gaining full American citizenship rights.
But the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act was viewed by the U.S. government as a vital component of the war effort to cement political and commercial relations with China. It was not viewed as a part of American domestic civil rights policy. Representative Gossett of Texas argued, “The bill under consideration is not an immigration bill. This bill is a war measure and a peace measure” (quoted in Divine 151). Similarly, President Franklin Roosevelt declared “I regard this legislation as important in the cause of winning the war and of establishing a secure peace. By the repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws we can correct a historic mistake and silence the distorted Japanese propaganda” (quoted in Divine 150). Ironically, Chinese Americans were still viewed as “foreigners” and “sojourners.”
To add to the irony, the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed in name only. In the complex confusion of immigration law, the repeal-only “opened” immigration to a quota of 105 newcomers/year. Thus the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act continued to keep the Chinese excluded -- from immigration and from domestic acceptance.
REVIEW OF THE 1882 CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT
Chinese immigration in this modern historical period began with gold rushers of 1848 and 1849. The myth of Gold Mountain coupled with the real need for cheap laborers in developing the American West caused the migration of tens of thousands of Chinese pioneers to California and the West. These early Chinese pioneers were vulnerable to the American tradition of racism.
Between the Panic of 1873 and the 1893 depression in California, anti-Chinese sentiment was growing into a movement. The boom of the gold rush was now a bust. European immigrants and their sons organized in labor unions such as the American Federation of Labor and the California Workingmen's Party were blaming the “foreigners” for unemployment and other social ills. The “Charles Crackers” who had recruited and contracted these Chinese pioneers were no longer willing to support them. The transcontinental railroad was finished but the Chinese continued to demand more wages and better treatment. On the other hand, Japanese contract laborers could now be recruited to work for even cheaper wages than the older Chinese.
In this atmosphere of economic tension, Samuel Gompers' strengthening American Federation of Labor successfully pushed U.S. Congress to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act. The main reason cited for the immigration restriction was to protect American labor (Curran 90). China was in no position to protest this discriminatory act as it was plagued with internal corruption and foreign colonialism. The imperial Qing (Ching) dynasty, titular government in China, generally viewed persons of Chinese ancestry outside China's boundaries as temporarily displaced subjects or “overseas Chinese” rather than as, say, Chinese Americans. After its defeat in the Opium Wars, the Qing dynasty could neither prevent the 1868 Burlingame Treaty allowing for Chinese immigration to the U.S. nor prevent the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, curtailing immigration to the U.S. Nor could they raise serious objections to the string of discriminatory actions against “overseas Chinese” including 1850s Foreign Miners' Tax, 1860 Police Tax on Mongolians, 1870 Pole Ordinance, 1873 Queue Ordinance, and 1879 California Constitution.
Despite a veto of an earlier version of the bill, President Arthur signed the first Chinese Exclusion Act on 6 May 1882. This law excluded Chinese laborers for ten years and prohibited the naturalization of Chinese already in the U.S. With the 1892 Geary Act and 1902 Act, this law was extended for ten-year periods until 1904, when the exclusion law was extended to run perpetually. The Chinese Exclusion Act prohibited the immigration of Chinese laborers except those classified as merchants, teachers, ministers, students, and visitors.
The ensuing Japanese laborers also wanted better wages and better treatment with time. The 1907 Gentlemen's Agreement curtailing immigration from Japan followed. Koreans, Indians and Pilipino immigration followed a similar pattern of open doors, immigrants agitating for equality, and then, closed doors. In 1924, the Asian Exclusion Act prevented further contract laborers from Asia although Pilipinos who were considered American nationals were exempted for another ten years.
THE REPEAL ACT
The Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed in 1943 during World War II. But the effort to win good will from United States' war ally, China, had little actual impact on immigration trends due to a myriad of technicalities.
In 1924, the National Origins Act was also passed under nativism pressure to curtail certain European immigration. Attempting to limit Slavics, Jews, Catholics, Poles, etc. who had begun to immigrate to Northeastern U.S. by the 1890s, the law of 1924 reduced immigration from European countries by using a formula. A quota of 2 percent of the numbers of residents from each nation as shown by the 1890 census was established. Thus, English immigration could continue but Eastern and Southern European immigration slowed down.
In 1924, the National Origins Act did not actually apply to Chinese as they were already excluded. But the quantitative formula would also have limited immigration from Asian nations to the maximum quota of 105 because the number of Asian residents in the U.S. in 1890 was minimal. Hawaii was not considered part of the United States. Thus, there was a double policy towards Chinese immigration by 1924.
The repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act meant that the Chinese now fell under the jurisdiction of the 1924 National Origins Act. To add injury to insult, U.S. immigration law had always determined quotas based on birth place. But for Chinese (and later Indians), the quota was determined by ancestry. This technicality had appeased anti-repeal efforts in 1943. Thus, a person with 50 percent Chinese blood was considered under the Chinese quota regardless of the person's birth origin. This prevented Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong, a British colony, as well as Chinese immigrants from Europe. Significantly, it established a separate quota of 100 for non-Chinese persons emigrating from China e.g. children of American missionaries and merchants (Sung 79).
Betty Lee Sung in Mountain of Gold (1967) wrote, “In answer to those who envisioned a deluge of Chinese immigrants after repeal, the annual quota of 105 was an effective cork (80-81).” A four-tier preference system was established under the quota. The first 50 percent of a country's quota was reserved for skilled aliens and their families with high education, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability as determined by the Attorney General. The next 30 percent of the quota was set aside for parents of citizens over 21 years of age. The remaining 20 percent was for spouses and children of permanent resident aliens residing in the United States. If there were any remaining slots from the first three preferences, they would go to the fourth preference for siblings or children over 21 years of age of American citizens (82).
The 1943 repeal act gave the right of naturalization to Chinese who had lawfully entered the United States. This was important in principle and some Chinese became eligible for the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. But the large numbers of Chinese who had emigrated as contract laborers before 1882 were now near their 80s and the illegal paper sons who immigrated after 1882 were ineligible. The repeal, however, did allow for future Chinese immigrants to gain citizenship rights.
MOVEMENT TOWARDS REPEAL 公民委员会
According to Fred W. Riggs' Pressures on Congress (1950), the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion Act was the main agent responsible for the 1943 action.
This Citizens Committee met six times with eleven members at the first general meeting, fifteen members at the second general meeting, and about six members at the last four executive committee meetings held between 25 May and 13 Oct 1943 (Riggs 47).
Important support for the Committee came from Donald Dunham, American consular service in Hong Kong;
Richard J. Walsh, editor of Asia and the Americas; Pearl S. Buck;
W.W. Pettus, President of the College of Chinese Studies, University of California; https://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/lookupname?key=Common%20Council%20for%20American%20Unity
Read Lewis of the Common Council for American Unity;
Monroe Sweetland of the C.I.O.; https://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/sweetland_monroe_1910_2006_/
Julean Arnold of the China Council of Berkeley, California;
and Congressman Walter H. Judd (Riggs 48-49). 向着台湾的
The Committee lobbied behind the scene for the repeal. They gained support especially from commercial interests (Riggs 92). The American business executives were not as interested in the potential of cheap labor from China as much as they were（兴趣点在于） concerned about improving commercial relations with China. The Committee also worked with religious groups. According to Riggs, of the forty-two 42个证人 中10个宗教代表 （宗教利益）witnesses for repeal at the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee hearings, ten represented religious interests (96). During the period of China's “open-door policy,” there were some 3000 missionaries in China (Riggs 98). Of the forty-two persons testifying before the House Committee, nineteen were “old-China-hands.” Of these “Old-China-hands,” eight had missionary background in China, seven had up to twenty years of business background in China, two were scholars, one was a Naval officer, and one had been an employee of the Chinese government (Riggs 108).
The Committee lobbied behind the scene for the repeal. They gained support especially from commercial interests (Riggs 92). The American business executives were not as interested in the potential of cheap labor from China as much as they were（兴趣点在于） concerned about improving commercial relations with China. The Committee also worked with religious groups. According to Riggs, of the forty-two 42个证人 中10个宗教代表 （宗教利益）witnesses for repeal at the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee hearings, ten represented religious interests (96). During the period of China's “open-door policy,” there were some 3000 missionaries in China (Riggs 98). Of the forty-two persons testifying before the House Committee, nineteen were “old-China-hands.” Of these “Old-China-hands,” eight had missionary background in China, seven had up to twenty years of business background in China, two were scholars, one was a Naval officer, and one had been an employee of the Chinese government (Riggs 108).
Riggs summarized the five basic arguments for the repeal. These were 要求废除的论点
(1) racial equality and human rights,
(2) justice to our Chinese allies,
(3) fairness to Chinese Americans,
(4) aid to future commercial relations with China, and
(5) help win the war (127).
The American Year Book of 1943 noted that the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act “was especially recommended by the President [Franklin Roosevelt on 11 October] and passed without difficulty” (cited in Riggs 38). Indeed, this was not exactly accurate. Despite the obvious presidential support, there had been several proposals that went through much discussion before the final repeal compromise was passed. To improve the chances of such a bill passing Congress, strategic decisions were made to focus on Chinese exclusion repeal （避重就轻 虚晃一枪）rather than elimination of the ban against all Asian immigration (Riggs 56). Most importantly the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act would by the 1924 Act give the Chinese a mere quota of 105. It was understood that the repeal （正因为是虚晃一枪才能通过）would not actually cause much ensuing immigration of Chinese. An important issue was that a “loophole would be opened for Chinese born in Hong Kong to come under the British quota or for those born in the Western Hemisphere outside the United States to enter as non-quota immigrants” (Riggs 39). The compromise finally adopted was that although Chinese Americans would now be eligible for citizenship, all immigrants of the Chinese “race” would come under the minuscule Chinese quota regardless of birthplace or nation of origin (Riggs 40). Furthermore, there was a stipulation that unlike other non-quota immigrants, wives and children of American citizens of Chinese descent could not immigrate (Riggs 40).
The American Year Book of 1943 noted that the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act “was especially recommended by the President [Franklin Roosevelt on 11 October] and passed without difficulty” (cited in Riggs 38). Indeed, this was not exactly accurate. Despite the obvious presidential support, there had been several proposals that went through much discussion before the final repeal compromise was passed. To improve the chances of such a bill passing Congress, strategic decisions were made to focus on Chinese exclusion repeal （避重就轻 虚晃一枪）rather than elimination of the ban against all Asian immigration (Riggs 56). Most importantly the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act would by the 1924 Act give the Chinese a mere quota of 105. It was understood that the repeal （正因为是虚晃一枪才能通过）would not actually cause much ensuing immigration of Chinese. An important issue was that a “loophole would be opened for Chinese born in Hong Kong to come under the British quota or for those born in the Western Hemisphere outside the United States to enter as non-quota immigrants” (Riggs 39). The compromise finally adopted was that although Chinese Americans would now be eligible for citizenship, all immigrants of the Chinese “race” would come under the minuscule Chinese quota regardless of birthplace or nation of origin (Riggs 40). Furthermore, there was a stipulation that unlike other non-quota immigrants, wives and children of American citizens of Chinese descent could not immigrate (Riggs 40).
RACISM BEHIND THE REPEAL （透露出的种族歧视）
The groups opposed to the repeal included the American Federation of Labor, American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, California Joint Immigration Commission, Grange, Native Sons of the Golden West, and some “patriotic” societies like the Daughters of the American Revolution and National Blue Star Mothers. Most of these organizations had a history of anti-Asian and anti-immigrant history.
Agnes Waters （https://nursingclio.org/2016/10/25/agnes-waters-the-pistol-packing-mama-for-president/）of the National Blue Star Mothers and the Crusading Mothers of Pennsylvania testified against the repeal indicating she represented millions of American women. She proclaimed that the women of America were “opposed to the invasion of this Republic by any other foreign nation” and “practically all of the Chinese are Communists and when they come in here, they come in here to ruin this country, and the greatest danger from them is the aliens in this country, and they are putting enemies in all our important positions in this administration ... And the Chinese race is a yellow race the white people have to fight, and if you are going to flood this country with the yellow race, I want to know it” (quoted in Riggs 89).
她宣称美国妇女“反对任何其他外国入侵”，并且“几乎所有的中国人都是共产党员，中国人来到这里是为了毁掉这个国家，而最大的危险就是外国人，他们在我们本届政府的所有重要职位上都设置了敌人……华人是黄种人，白种人必须与 黄种人战斗，如果这个国家 满是黄种人，我必须知道”
John B. Revor of the America Coalition declared that “the Chinese are, morally, the most debased people on the face of the earth” (quoted in Riggs 90).
“中国人从道德上来说，是地球上最低劣的人口”
Riggs summarized the five major arguments against the repeal as
(1) premature, wait till the war is over,
(2) opening wedge,
(3) employment for American veterans and labor,
(4) racial purity or White supremacy,
and (5) America for Americans (127).
But the proponents of the repeal and their arguments for repeal also had racist tendencies, albeit more subtle. This is exemplified by Fred W. Riggs himself in his book Pressures on Congress (1950) urging for better treatment of the Chinese and the passing of what will be the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. In his preface, Riggs views the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act as more of an important part of “this country's foreign policy” rather than a domestic civil rights issue (viii). In Chapter 4 of his book, he exemplifies his stereotypic views in his description of the scenario that allowed for the passing of the repeal:
“The composition of the Chinese population itself also changed. Whereas originally it consisted almost exclusively of adult male aliens, by 1940 balanced family life has become more prevalent and the ratio of Chinese American citizens to aliens was 108 to 100. Consequently, the Chinese population more closely approximated the whites in composition and behavior (emphasis mine).
“Factors contributing to cultural isolation were also reduced. Whereas originally most of the Chinese immigrants could communicate with the “whites” only through interpreters, by 1940 almost all could speak idiomatic English. The disappearance of the queue and the adoption of Western clothing were not unimportant changes in the same direction. The right of suffrage accorded to American-born Chinese perhaps made irresponsibility toward them less safe politically, even though the Chinese vote is scarcely decisive outside of Hawaii.
“An important factor in the later acceptance of the Chinese was their entrance into characteristic occupations held as a natural monopoly, notably, the hand laundry and Chinese restaurant ... This occupational specialization destroyed “white” labor's fear of competition, while enjoyment of the Chinese cuisine and other services won for the “Celestial” the patronizing good-will, if not the friendship, of a substantial section of the American public” (Riggs 29-30).
Another variable, Riggs continues, is that the U.S. began to view itself more and more as a “benevolent protector of China's independence” as Japanese encroachment into Manchuria in 1932 began (31). “Whatever the motives, the Open Door had become a cardinal principle of American foreign policy and friendship for China an established tradition” (Riggs 31). Warren G. Magnuson who testified on behalf of the repeal “stressed the value of the measure in counteracting Japanese propaganda and strengthening Chinese morale” (Riggs 84). Seattle Chamber of Commerce indicated their support of the repeal “thereby indicating our friendship toward China and her people” (quoted in Riggs 85).
Riggs probably correctly identified the variables that led to the improvement of sentiment towards Chinese Americans. But from his writings, American sentiment of that era can be well gauged: (1) Chinese Americans as still viewed as exotic foreigners and Celestials, (2) the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act was part of U.S. foreign policy and commercial policy (not civil rights policy), and (3) American colonialism in China (i.e. Open Door Policy) was justified by the White man's burden argument. Inherent in Riggs' mentality and American tradition was the
racism of manifest destiny.
INVOLVEMENT OF CHINESE AND CHINESE AMERICANS
The Citizens Committee consciously decided to limit membership to American citizens not of Asian descent (Riggs 113). It earlier conferred with C. L. Hsia, director of Chinese News Services. But Riggs reported that “He was interested and thought that much could be said for going ahead with a campaign immediately. He offered to furnish information assistance but felt it would be unwise for a Chinese to figure too conspicuously” (49-50).
The Chinese government was conspicuous in its inaction. In 1943, Madame Chiang Kai-shek had toured the United States and successfully improved sentiments of good will for China as a war ally. But she “avoided mentioning the subject of Chinese exclusion in any public statement” (Riggs 114). Riggs also researched and concluded that the Chinese embassy chose to support the movement quietly and through unofficial channels. The ranking Republican on the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee, Noah M. Mason (Ill) made the following statement:
“The Chinese people through accredited representatives have said definitely that this is a very important emergency war measure and cannot wait until after the war ... and that comes from authoritative sources, from China itself, and not from unauthoritative or ill-informed sources” (quoted in Riggs 115).
The Chinese Americans seemed to have played a very low keyed role in the repeal process as well. Only two Chinese Americans testified in the House Committee along with two non-Chinese Asians. Dr. Li Min Hin（韩国人https://apps.library.und.edu/archon/?p=collections/findingaid&id=224&q=&rootcontentid=9934） testified on the role of and contributions of Chinese in Hawaii. He concluded that “Hawaii furnishes the best example in the United States of the assimilability of the Chinese into the American way of life” (quoted in Riggs 112). Paul Yee, an electronics engineer in the War Department, testified on the contributions of many skilled Chinese technicians in various war industries and armed services. Dr. Taraknath Das, professor at the College of the City of New York, discussed American exclusion policies in the context of international relations and Kilsoo K. Haan, Washington representative of the Korean National Front Federation and the Sino-Korean Peoples' League, discussed the implications of the repeal to winning the war (Riggs 112-113).
But the proponents of the repeal and their arguments for repeal also had racist tendencies, albeit more subtle. This is exemplified by Fred W. Riggs himself in his book Pressures on Congress (1950) urging for better treatment of the Chinese and the passing of what will be the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. In his preface, Riggs views the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act as more of an important part of “this country's foreign policy” rather than a domestic civil rights issue (viii). In Chapter 4 of his book, he exemplifies his stereotypic views in his description of the scenario that allowed for the passing of the repeal:
“The composition of the Chinese population itself also changed. Whereas originally it consisted almost exclusively of adult male aliens, by 1940 balanced family life has become more prevalent and the ratio of Chinese American citizens to aliens was 108 to 100. Consequently, the Chinese population more closely approximated the whites in composition and behavior (emphasis mine).
“Factors contributing to cultural isolation were also reduced. Whereas originally most of the Chinese immigrants could communicate with the “whites” only through interpreters, by 1940 almost all could speak idiomatic English. The disappearance of the queue and the adoption of Western clothing were not unimportant changes in the same direction. The right of suffrage accorded to American-born Chinese perhaps made irresponsibility toward them less safe politically, even though the Chinese vote is scarcely decisive outside of Hawaii.
“An important factor in the later acceptance of the Chinese was their entrance into characteristic occupations held as a natural monopoly, notably, the hand laundry and Chinese restaurant ... This occupational specialization destroyed “white” labor's fear of competition, while enjoyment of the Chinese cuisine and other services won for the “Celestial” the patronizing good-will, if not the friendship, of a substantial section of the American public” (Riggs 29-30).
Another variable, Riggs continues, is that the U.S. began to view itself more and more as a “benevolent protector of China's independence” as Japanese encroachment into Manchuria in 1932 began (31). “Whatever the motives, the Open Door had become a cardinal principle of American foreign policy and friendship for China an established tradition” (Riggs 31). Warren G. Magnuson who testified on behalf of the repeal “stressed the value of the measure in counteracting Japanese propaganda and strengthening Chinese morale” (Riggs 84). Seattle Chamber of Commerce indicated their support of the repeal “thereby indicating our friendship toward China and her people” (quoted in Riggs 85).
Riggs probably correctly identified the variables that led to the improvement of sentiment towards Chinese Americans. But from his writings, American sentiment of that era can be well gauged: (1) Chinese Americans as still viewed as exotic foreigners and Celestials, (2) the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act was part of U.S. foreign policy and commercial policy (not civil rights policy), and (3) American colonialism in China (i.e. Open Door Policy) was justified by the White man's burden argument. Inherent in Riggs' mentality and American tradition was the
racism of manifest destiny.
INVOLVEMENT OF CHINESE AND CHINESE AMERICANS
The Citizens Committee consciously decided to limit membership to American citizens not of Asian descent (Riggs 113). It earlier conferred with C. L. Hsia, director of Chinese News Services. But Riggs reported that “He was interested and thought that much could be said for going ahead with a campaign immediately. He offered to furnish information assistance but felt it would be unwise for a Chinese to figure too conspicuously” (49-50).
The Chinese government was conspicuous in its inaction. In 1943, Madame Chiang Kai-shek had toured the United States and successfully improved sentiments of good will for China as a war ally. But she “avoided mentioning the subject of Chinese exclusion in any public statement” (Riggs 114). Riggs also researched and concluded that the Chinese embassy chose to support the movement quietly and through unofficial channels. The ranking Republican on the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee, Noah M. Mason (Ill) made the following statement:
“The Chinese people through accredited representatives have said definitely that this is a very important emergency war measure and cannot wait until after the war ... and that comes from authoritative sources, from China itself, and not from unauthoritative or ill-informed sources” (quoted in Riggs 115).
The Chinese Americans seemed to have played a very low keyed role in the repeal process as well. Only two Chinese Americans testified in the House Committee along with two non-Chinese Asians. Dr. Li Min Hin（韩国人https://apps.library.und.edu/archon/?p=collections/findingaid&id=224&q=&rootcontentid=9934） testified on the role of and contributions of Chinese in Hawaii. He concluded that “Hawaii furnishes the best example in the United States of the assimilability of the Chinese into the American way of life” (quoted in Riggs 112). Paul Yee, an electronics engineer in the War Department, testified on the contributions of many skilled Chinese technicians in various war industries and armed services. Dr. Taraknath Das, professor at the College of the City of New York, discussed American exclusion policies in the context of international relations and Kilsoo K. Haan, Washington representative of the Korean National Front Federation and the Sino-Korean Peoples' League, discussed the implications of the repeal to winning the war (Riggs 112-113).
Some behind-the-scene support by Chinese Americans for the repeal is known. George Kin Leung of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association in New York wrote Martin J. Kennedy of the House Committee:
“Born in New Jersey, having lived 17 years and China, and now sojourning in our New York City and State, you may imagine how keenly I feel on this subject. I thank you from the bottom of my heart, as do my friends, for preparing sunlight and rain for the plant of friendship between China and America which must be fed now, before the war ends, to make easy the postwar cooperation. I trust that you have ample health to realize all your good works (quoted in Riggs 111-112).”
Mrs. Theodora Chan Wang of the Chinese Women's Association of New York wrote a similar letter of support to Eleanor Roosevelt:
“We feel that if this privilege is granted us, there is no Chinese in this country who would not go far beyond the contribution now so freely given, in the sacrifice of his fortune, and his very life, to preserve the ideals of America, the traditional friend of China (quoted in Riggs 111).”
Jack Chow and Albert Chow, two immigration attorneys for the Chinese American Citizens Alliance, were known to frequently travel between San Francisco and Washington D.C. during this time. Their specific strategies, however, are still buried in records (Lee interview). Another group of Chinese Americans in Hawaii made an unsolicited donation of $1,116 to the Citizens Committee, one-fourth of the funds received by the Committee (Riggs 112).
Other activities by Chinese Americans on behalf of the repeal movement is unknown or possibly, nonexistent. Were there public demonstrations on behalf of the repeal or celebrations after the success of the repeal? How was the subject discussed in Chinese American newspapers and in Chinese American organizations? Did the Chinese Americans purposely keep out of the national discussion in hopes of not jeopardizing the movement? Did they want to help characterize the work of the Citizens Committee as the work of European American liberals and humanitarians rather than self-serving Chinese Americans? Did the Chinese Americans stay out of the movement knowing that it would have little actual impact? Were they apathetic or even disgusted at the hypocrisy of this supposed anti-racist movement? Did they hope to encourage pro-Kuomintang sentiment? Did the conflicting politics between the Kuomintang Nationalists and the Chinese Communist Party hinder Chinese American political activism? Many questions remain regarding Chinese and Chinese American political sentiment during this era.
ACTUAL IMPACT OF REPEAL ON IMMIGRATION FROM CHINA
If the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act did not actually lead to a real change in immigration patterns, it did perhaps establish a precedence of principles. The War Brides Act of 28 December 1945 and G. I. Fiancées Act of 29 June 1946 paved the way for the entrance of some Chinese women married to Chinese American soldiers (Kung 117).
The Act of 9 August 1946 exempted all Chinese wives of American citizens from the quota restrictions (Kung 112). The 1948 Displaced Persons Act gave amnesty
to a number of Chinese temporarily in the U.S. before 30 April 1949 (Kung 118). The 1953 Refugee Relief Act allowed in Chinese elite after the 1949 Chinese
Communist Revolution. It gave a total of 2000 visas to Chinese elite who had passports endorsed by the Chinese National government or its authorized representatives.
Ninety thousand slots went to German refugees in this same 1953 Act. Some Chinese already in the U.S. were able to use the Refugee Act to adjust their official
immigration status (Kung 119). Congress also established a series of 133 private legislation that allowed in a small elite number of Chinese nationals (Kung 132).
The 1943 repeal of the Chinese Exclusion act opened a crack in U.S. immigration doors.
S. W. Kung in Chinese in American Life (1962) described the new quota in action in the fiscal year ending in 1955. Total number of Chinese immigrants in this period was 2,628 with 1,562 nonquota immigrants, mostly wives and children of Chinese American citizens gaining entrance with the Warbrides Act. Nonquota immigrants also included ministers and professors who were exempted even under the Chinese Exclusion Act. Of the 1,066 quota immigrants, 1,012 had already been in the U.S. and had their status adjusted by suspension of deportation, by private bill, by special acts of Congress, or as displaced persons/refugees. Thus only 54 Chinese were actually admitted from abroad as quota immigrants (107). In 1946, Indian and Pilipino exclusion laws were also repealed and these Americans would gain the rights to naturalized citizenship. Persons of Indian descent (not persons born in India) gained an immigration quota of 105. Citizens of the former U.S. colony, Philippines, gained an immigration quota of fifty. The 1952 McCarran-Walter Bill would extend similar rights to Koreans and Japanese by negating the 1907 Gentlemen's Agreement.
But it was the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act that caused the dynamic change of U.S. immigration policy. The current 25,000 per nation of birth annual quota is valid for Europeans, Africans, Latinos, as well as Asians. The 1965 Immigration Act established a system of priorities favoring immediate family members and members of professions with exceptional ability. The 1965 Act, revised in 1990, has triggered the recent increase in Chinese immigration from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, and China. But people like the Chinese railroad workers of yesteryears would still be excluded under current immigration policy. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act is one reason why some Chinese today hoping to immigrate to the United States must resort to signing illegal contracts with gangsters to come on steerage boats to Gaam Saan.
SUMMARY
The 1943 repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act is a milestone in Chinese American history. But ironically, the United States was motivated by wartime and commercial interests, and not by concerns for domestic civil rights. Indeed, the Chinese Americans may have had to purposely repress their political lobbying in the repeal movement to ensure its passage. The immediate actual impact of the repeal was minimal. Other legislative technicalities would continue to limit immigration from China to a small quota. But despite these contradictions, the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act did give Chinese Americans rights to naturalization and impetus to be regarded as full American citizens. Chinese were no longer particularly singled out for exclusion.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Divine, Robert A. American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957.
Kung, S. W. Chinese in American Life, Some Aspects of Their History, Status, Problems, and Contributions. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962.
Lee, Yvonne. Telephone interview in May of 1993 with staff director of San Francisco's Chinese American Citizens Alliance office.
Lyman, Stanford M., Chinese Americans. New York: Random House, 1974.
Riggs, Fred W. Pressures On Congress, A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1950.
Sung, Betty Lee. Mountain of Gold, The Story of the Chinese in America. New York: MacMillan Company, 1967.
About the author: Susie Ling has been teaching Asian American studies at Pasadena City College for ten years. A member of the Chinese Historical Society of Southern California, she has enjoyed the lectures and conferences, the fieldtrips, serving as docent for the Chinatown tour, and meeting the good people in the Society.
*This author defines “Chinese Americans” as persons of Chinese descent residing permanently in the United States. Chinese Americans did not receive the right to naturalized citizenship until 1943, so many were Chinese nationals. Other Chinese Americans were American citizens as they were born in the United States.
-- From the Gum Saan Journal of the Chinese Historical Society of Southern California -- Vol. 16, No. 2, December 1993. See: https://gumsaanjournal.com/.../scanned_volumes/gsj-1993.pdf
S. W. Kung in Chinese in American Life (1962) described the new quota in action in the fiscal year ending in 1955. Total number of Chinese immigrants in this period was 2,628 with 1,562 nonquota immigrants, mostly wives and children of Chinese American citizens gaining entrance with the Warbrides Act. Nonquota immigrants also included ministers and professors who were exempted even under the Chinese Exclusion Act. Of the 1,066 quota immigrants, 1,012 had already been in the U.S. and had their status adjusted by suspension of deportation, by private bill, by special acts of Congress, or as displaced persons/refugees. Thus only 54 Chinese were actually admitted from abroad as quota immigrants (107). In 1946, Indian and Pilipino exclusion laws were also repealed and these Americans would gain the rights to naturalized citizenship. Persons of Indian descent (not persons born in India) gained an immigration quota of 105. Citizens of the former U.S. colony, Philippines, gained an immigration quota of fifty. The 1952 McCarran-Walter Bill would extend similar rights to Koreans and Japanese by negating the 1907 Gentlemen's Agreement.
But it was the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act that caused the dynamic change of U.S. immigration policy. The current 25,000 per nation of birth annual quota is valid for Europeans, Africans, Latinos, as well as Asians. The 1965 Immigration Act established a system of priorities favoring immediate family members and members of professions with exceptional ability. The 1965 Act, revised in 1990, has triggered the recent increase in Chinese immigration from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, and China. But people like the Chinese railroad workers of yesteryears would still be excluded under current immigration policy. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act is one reason why some Chinese today hoping to immigrate to the United States must resort to signing illegal contracts with gangsters to come on steerage boats to Gaam Saan.
SUMMARY
The 1943 repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act is a milestone in Chinese American history. But ironically, the United States was motivated by wartime and commercial interests, and not by concerns for domestic civil rights. Indeed, the Chinese Americans may have had to purposely repress their political lobbying in the repeal movement to ensure its passage. The immediate actual impact of the repeal was minimal. Other legislative technicalities would continue to limit immigration from China to a small quota. But despite these contradictions, the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act did give Chinese Americans rights to naturalization and impetus to be regarded as full American citizens. Chinese were no longer particularly singled out for exclusion.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Divine, Robert A. American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957.
Kung, S. W. Chinese in American Life, Some Aspects of Their History, Status, Problems, and Contributions. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962.
Lee, Yvonne. Telephone interview in May of 1993 with staff director of San Francisco's Chinese American Citizens Alliance office.
Lyman, Stanford M., Chinese Americans. New York: Random House, 1974.
Riggs, Fred W. Pressures On Congress, A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1950.
Sung, Betty Lee. Mountain of Gold, The Story of the Chinese in America. New York: MacMillan Company, 1967.
About the author: Susie Ling has been teaching Asian American studies at Pasadena City College for ten years. A member of the Chinese Historical Society of Southern California, she has enjoyed the lectures and conferences, the fieldtrips, serving as docent for the Chinatown tour, and meeting the good people in the Society.
*This author defines “Chinese Americans” as persons of Chinese descent residing permanently in the United States. Chinese Americans did not receive the right to naturalized citizenship until 1943, so many were Chinese nationals. Other Chinese Americans were American citizens as they were born in the United States.
-- From the Gum Saan Journal of the Chinese Historical Society of Southern California -- Vol. 16, No. 2, December 1993. See: https://gumsaanjournal.com/.../scanned_volumes/gsj-1993.pdf
为废除排华法
Jack Chow弟弟
William Jack Chow was born on July 3, 1909 in Fresno, California. Chow received his B.S. from Saint Mary's College and J.D. from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law in 1935.
Albert Chow 哥哥
politically well-connected older brother, Albert Chow
